管理层权力与会计信息质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

以薪酬激励研究中的管理层权力理论为基础,结合大股东权力,考察了我国上市公司中管理层权力对会计信息质量的影响。研究结果表明,在总体样本分析中,管理层权力对会计稳健性有显著的负向影响作用。将股东权力纳入分析框架后,经验证据支持以下结论:与股权集中度较高的上市公司相比,股权集中度较低的上市公司中的管理层权力对会计稳健性有更为显著的负向影响作用;与国有上市公司相比,非国有上市公司中的管理层权力对会计稳健性具有更为显著的负向影响作用。

Managerial Power and Accounting Information Quality——Data from Chinese Security Market

Based on managerial power theory of compensation incentive research,the article focuses on the influence of managerial power on accounting information in the public companies,which is interacted with controlling shareholder power.The result indicates that managerial power shows a significant negative relationship to accounting conservatism.Having included controlling shareholder power within our analysis,authors draw the following conclusions from empirical findings.Compared to the public companies with concentrated ownership,managerial power impacts more negatively on accounting conservatism with statistical significance in companies with diversified ownership.Compared with state-owned companies,managerial power tends to have a more significant negative relationship with accounting conservatism in non-state-owned companies.