绩效诱因契约设计对经理人风险行为的影响

经理人与投资人之间的代理问题是由于在信息不对称的环境下,投资人无法观察到经理人的经营活动是否真正从投资人的利益角度出发,从而引发了经理人的道德风险,产生了自利性高风险投资组合的逆诱因选择。通过应用选择权的观念推导三种不同的绩效诱因契约设计,对于抑制经理人自利性风险调整行为倾向有较好的效果。

Impact of Performance Incentive Contract to Managers'''' Risk Adjustment Behavior

Asymmetry of information prevents investors from observing whether managers are maximizing the value of the investors, thus incurring moral hazard on the side of mangers that may lead to counter incentive option of egoist high-risk portfolio. Applying the idea of option incentives, this paper derives three different performance-based incentive contract designs that prove effective in constraining the egoist risk-adjustment behavior.