Exchange and optimality |
| |
Authors: | S Ghosal H M Polemarchakis |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, Mile End Road, London E1-4NS, UK, GB;(2) CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, BELGIUM (e-mail: hp@core.ucl.ac.be), BE |
| |
Abstract: | Summary. A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals into two groups, there
exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly
better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.
Received: September 9, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1998 |
| |
Keywords: | and Phrases: Social states Optimality Exchange JEL Classification Numbers: C70 C72 D60 D62 |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|