AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY |
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| Authors: | Adamos Andreou Sofia N. Andreou Aurora García‐Gallego Nikolaos Georgantzís |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Economics Department, University of Cyprus, , Cyprus;2. LEE and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, , Spain;3. GLOBE and Economics Department, Granada University, , Spain |
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| Abstract: | We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non‐binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency. |
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| Keywords: | experiments trade unions ultimatum bargaining wages C92 C78 J51 J52 |
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