Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation |
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Authors: | Pablo Amors |
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Institution: | Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga, Campus El Ejido, E-29013, Málaga, Spain;CentrA, Spain |
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Abstract: | We study Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function, and show the importance of allowing the planner to sometimes take away resources from the agents. |
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Keywords: | Implementation theory Nash equilibrium Renegotiation function |
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