| Abstract: | We analyze 52 Taiwanese IPOs that were introduced through discriminatory auctions (you pay what you bid) between December 1995 and October 1998. The evidence suggests that the elasticity of demand for IPOs in Taiwan through discriminatory auctions is relatively flat. The elasticity is significantly negatively correlated with bidders’heterogeneity, which is consistent with the investor heterogeneity hypothesis. We also find that the average winning bidders earn a significant average abnormal return of 7.83% in the post–IPO market. The post–IPO market abnormal return is positively correlated with the demand elasticity, the idiosyncratic risk of stock returns and the institutional participation rate, and is negatively correlated with the auction clearing price, which is consistent with theory. Finally, there is evidence that informed investors have an incentive to shade their demand for IPOs to avoid the winner’scurse. The most aggressive bidders (the top 5% of the winning bidders) on average incur a small loss of 1.64% (not significant) in the market–adjusted initial returns. |
