On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects |
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Authors: | Roger Lagunoff |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057, USA |
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Abstract: | How do individuals' spatial decisions affect the institutions for public goods provision over time? This paper describes a dynamic model in which the provision mechanism for a public project is itself the object of locational choice of individuals. Individuals in an ongoing society must choose between a location with a Majority Rule mechanism and one with a Voluntary Contribution mechanism. Each mechanism determines a funding decision for a local public project which is repeated over time. Generations of individuals asynchronously supercede their ‘parents’, creating an entry/exit process that allows individuals with possibly different beliefs to enter society. A self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) belief process describes an evolution of beliefs in this society consistent with a self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) of the repeated location/provision game. It is shown that the process with belief mutation as new individuals enter society results in a globally absorbing state in which the Majority Rule mechanism is the unique survivor of the two. |
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Keywords: | Voluntary contribution mechanism Majority rule mechanism Belief process Self-confirming equilibrium Absorbing states |
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