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代理人为什么接受委托人的损害:“公有关系合约”的注解
引用本文:徐德信.代理人为什么接受委托人的损害:“公有关系合约”的注解[J].安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版),2006,23(5):35-39,152.
作者姓名:徐德信
作者单位:安徽工业大学,文法学院,安徽,马鞍山,243002
摘    要:“委托人问题”是指面对多任务委托的巨大考核费用,委托人的无所作为损害了代理人利益。在“公有关系合约”中,委托人有信息使得代理人私人信息对于多任务委托合约不具有绝对优势;由于委托人团体成员的搭便车与利益差别,代理人替代了委托人主动地进行多任务委托考核,据此获得一定的谈判控制权作为受害的补偿。委托代理双方损害具有相互性。

关 键 词:委托人  代理人  公有关系合约  多任务委托  谈判控制权  公有经济
文章编号:1671-9247(2006)05-0035-06
修稿时间:2005年12月10日

Why the Agent Accepts the Damage from Principal's:An Explanatory Note from "Relational Contract in Public Ownership"
Authors:XU De-xin
Abstract:"The principal's problem" refers to the huge measurement cost when facing multitask principal,and the principal's state of inertia which resulting in the damage of agent's benefits.Under the circumstance of the principal's information in "relational contract in public ownership",the agent's private information does not have overwhelming superiority to multitask principal-agency contract;owing to the "free rider problem" from the members of the principal's group and the different benefits,the agent positively examines multitask principal instead of the principal,and serves as the compensation of the affected.The damage of both the principal and the agent is mutual.
Keywords:principal  agent  relational contract in public ownership  multitask principal  negotiate rights of control  public economy
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