Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria |
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Authors: | J Jude Kline |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Australian National University, 0200 Canberra, ACT, Australia |
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Abstract: | Summary Decentralizability with respect to an equilibrium concept means that those equilibria for an extensive game and its agent normal form game coincide for any given payoffs. We consider decentralizability of Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect equilibrium. For each equilibrium concept we give a necessary and sufficient condition on the information structure of an extensive game for decentralizability to hold. When it holds it does not matter if agents with the same objectives decide independently or have someone coordinate their actions.The author thanks Satish Chand, Mamoru Kaneko, Akira Okada and participants at seminars at the Australian National University, Kyoto University, University of Tsukuba, and The First Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Keio University for valuable suggestions and comments. |
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