Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level |
| |
Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Thomas?GaubeEmail author |
| |
Institution: | (1) Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany |
| |
Abstract: | Due to the use of distortionary taxation, many believe that real-world economies should attain a lower level of public expenditures than in a situation where lump-sum taxes are available. The present paper examines this hypothesis by means of the two-type self-selection model of income taxation. Based on the findings of Boadway and Keen (1993), I provide sufficient conditions for both a lower and a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best. In particular, it is shown that the separability assumption of Christiansen (1981) leads to under-provision of the public good in the income tax optimum. |
| |
Keywords: | income taxation public goods |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |