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中国省级税收竞争与环境污染——基于1998-2006年面板数据的分析
引用本文:崔亚飞,刘小川.中国省级税收竞争与环境污染——基于1998-2006年面板数据的分析[J].财经研究,2010(4).
作者姓名:崔亚飞  刘小川
作者单位:上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院;安徽财经大学财政与公共管理学院
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目(09BJY093);;安徽财经大学2007年度青年科研项目(ACKYQ0705ZD)
摘    要:文章利用1998-2006年面板数据分析了中国省级税收竞争与环境污染之间的关系,实证结果表明:(1)地方政府在税收竞争中对污染治理采取了骑跷跷板策略,并存在趋劣竞争现象;(2)增加地方政府可支配财力有利于外部性不大的污染物的治理;(3)排污费制度对工业固体废弃物和工业废水的排放强度有一定的抑制作用,但对工业二氧化硫排放强度并未起到应有的缩减功能;(4)中央政府颁布的环境标准对促进地方环境质量改善效果甚微。

关 键 词:税收竞争  环境污染  骑跷跷板策略  趋劣竞争

Provincial Tax Competition and Environmental Pollution:Based on Panel Data from 1998 to 2006 in China
CUI Ya-fei,LIU Xiao-chuan.Provincial Tax Competition and Environmental Pollution:Based on Panel Data from 1998 to 2006 in China[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2010(4).
Authors:CUI Ya-fei    LIU Xiao-chuan
Institution:1.School of Public Economics and Administration;Shanghai University ofFinance and Economics;Shanghai 200433;China;2.School of PublicFinance and Administration;Anhui University of Finance andEconomics;Bengbu 233030;China
Abstract:The paper studies the relationship between tax competition and environmental pollution by China's provincial-level panel data from 1998 to 2006.Empirical results are as follows: firstly,local governments take the strategy of riding on a seesaw against environmental pollution and there is a race-to-the-bottom in tax competition;secondly,the increase of the disposable financial resources of local government helps to control pollution sources with small externalities;thirdly,sewage charge system has certain en...
Keywords:tax competition  environmental pollution  strategy of riding on a seesaw  race to the bottom  
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