垄断厂商的过剩生产能力可置信威胁行为分析

本文以完全垄断市场中在位企业阻止对手进入作为研究的基本问题，使用博弈论方法，在假定完全信息条件下，通过允许对手进入的斯塔克尔伯格均衡和阻止对手进入的过剩生产能力可置信威胁策略性行为的比较分析，论证了企业中存在过剩生产能力的一类原因，解释了企业的理性选择使部分的生产能力闲置，是一种特定条件下各利益主体最大化其效用时出现的相对稳定状态。垄断企业通过投资于过剩生产能力，使它对潜在进入者的威胁变得可置信，从而能够阻止进入。本文的研究结果表明，企业选择保持过剩的生产能力是在特定条件下的理性选择，是根据特定的技术和市场条件确定的。

Credibility Threats Analysis of Monopoly Firm' s Excess Capacity

This papertakes the dominantfirm in complete monopoly market who deters a new entrantto enter as the basic problem,given the complete information, by the comparative analysis ofthe Stackelberg equilibrium which permits entry and the credibilitythreat strategy behavior of excess capacity which deters entry, proved the reason ofthe existence ofthe excess capacity, explainedthatthe firm who rationally chose excess capacity is a relative steady statement. The dominantfirm makes the threats to the new en-trants credible by investing excess capacity, and thereby can deter entry. The result ofthis paper shows that holding the excess ca-pacity is a rational choice forfirms under certain conditions, and itis determined by the specialtechnology and market conditions.