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横向兼并、福利增进与反垄断政策
引用本文:刘大勇.横向兼并、福利增进与反垄断政策[J].财经科学,2009(12).
作者姓名:刘大勇
作者单位:南开大学经济系,天津,300071
摘    要:在对企业横向兼并行为的反垄断审查中,存在两个重要指标:市场份额与产业集中度。本文将企业横向兼并行为的三种反垄断判断标准(福利标准)归纳为两种福利增进情况。并且,根据这两种福利增进的情况,建立均衡福利模型,得出实现福利增进所必须满足的市场条件,从而做出更加明确的反垄断判定。结合我国新出台《反垄断法》后第一起也是唯一的一起兼并失败案(可口可乐兼并汇源失败)进行分析,并基于我国反垄断现状和模型结论,提出相关建议。

关 键 词:反垄断  横向兼并  产业集中  剩余  

Horizontal Merger, Welfare Promotion and Antitrust Policy
Liu Dayong.Horizontal Merger, Welfare Promotion and Antitrust Policy[J].Finance and Economics,2009(12).
Authors:Liu Dayong
Abstract:There are two important indexes which are market share and industrial concentration in checkup of antitrust for horizontal mergers of enterprises.This paper summed up the three antitrust criterions(welfare criterion)of horizontal mergers into two situations:welfare promotion by lower prices and by raising the total surplus.In the third and fourth section this paper separately establishes equilibrium welfare model to analyze the conditions of the enterprise and market in accordance with the two former situat...
Keywords:Antitrust  Horizontal Mergers  Industrial Concentration  Surplus  
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