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排他性合约下的纵向控制:关于独占交易理论的研究评述
引用本文:洪夙,郁义鸿. 排他性合约下的纵向控制:关于独占交易理论的研究评述[J]. 产业经济研究, 2005, 0(4): 50-56
作者姓名:洪夙  郁义鸿
作者单位:复旦大学,管理学院,上海,200433;复旦大学,管理学院,上海,200433
摘    要:独占交易理论是纵向控制理论研究领域的一个重要组成部分。在某种程度上,它和纵向兼并理论比较类似,但是,它主要研究了上下游厂商之间的博弈,从而增强了对现实经济现象的解释力。在独占交易理论对政策和反托拉斯法的指导方面,多通过与共同代理对市场竞争程度和社会福利做比较,以提供一些理论基础。本文梳理了独占交易理论产生和演进的脉络,并介绍了这一理论的应用和实证检验成果,最后指出了现有模型中有待进一步研究的问题以及该领域未来发展的方向。

关 键 词:独占交易  共同代理  纵向控制
文章编号:1671-9301(2005)04-0050-07
修稿时间:2005-05-16

Vertical Control Under Exclusive Contracts: an Overview of the Theory of Exclusive Dealing
HONG Su,YU Yihong. Vertical Control Under Exclusive Contracts: an Overview of the Theory of Exclusive Dealing[J]. Industrial Economics Research, 2005, 0(4): 50-56
Authors:HONG Su  YU Yihong
Abstract:The theory of exclusive dealing is one of the important parts of the theory of vertical control. It has common with the thoery of vertical merge to some extent. However, it focuses on the game between upstream and downstream firms to explain more of the real life economic phenomenon. The theory of exclusive dealing also has some guidance to policies and Antitrust Regulation by comparing the market competition and welfare with common agency. This paper provides an overview of the development of the theory of exclusive dealing, the application and related empirical study and the direction of furture study.
Keywords:exclusive dealing  common agency  vertical control  
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