Violence,access, and competition in the market for protection |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA;2. School of Arts and Sciences, Johnson and Wales University, 801 West Trade Street, Charlotte, NC 28202, USA;3. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USA;1. Schmid College of Science, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA;2. Isaac Newton Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB3 0EH, United Kingdom;3. Department of Physics and Astronomy, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA;3. Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104;4. Cell and Molecular Biology Group, Biomedical Graduate Studies, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104;5. Institute on Aging, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104;6. Department of Molecular Biology and Biochemistry, Rutgers University, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854;1. Faculty of Mathematics, Physics, and Computation, Schmid College of Science and Technology, Chapman University, One University Drive Orange, CA 92866, USA;2. Politecnico di Milano, Dipartimento di Matematica, Via E. Bonardi, 9, 20133 Milano, Italy;3. School of electrical and computer engineering Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O.B. 653, Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel;3. From the Department of Microbiology and;4. Center for RNA Biology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210 |
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| Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the performance of a market for protection. As the central feature of our treatment comparisons, we vary the access that “peasants” have to violence-empowered “elites”. The focus of the experiment is to observe how elites enforce and operate their protective services to peasants, and to observe the degree to which elites engage in wealth-destroying violence in competition amongst each other for wealth-generating peasants. We find that greater access to peasants strikingly increases violence among the elites, but with limited access the elites markedly extract more tribute from the peasants. Our findings are particularly relevant to the discussion of violence in developing countries. |
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