Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts |
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Affiliation: | 1. Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU) and Vienna Institute of Demography, Wohllebengasse 12-14, 1040 Vienna, Austria;2. Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, UK |
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Abstract: | We model purchaser–provider contracts when providers can inflate reimbursable activity through manipulation. Providers are audited and fined upon detected fraud. We characterise the optimal price and audit policy both in the presence and absence of commitment to an audit intensity. Under ‘non-commitment’ the audit intensity increases in reported activity, allowing the provider to soften it by reducing activity together with the underlying service quality and manipulation. The purchaser then faces a trade-off between offsetting this tendency by raising price and committing to a low audit intensity by reducing price. We identify circumstances under which the two forces balance out. |
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