Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia;2. University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z4;1. California Institute of Technology, 1200 East California Blvd, Pasadena, CA 91125, United States;2. Calgent LLC, 11011 Torreyana Road, San Diego, CA 92121, United States;1. Department of Economics and Law, University of Rome “Sapienza”, Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Rome, Italy;2. School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Road, E2 4NS London, UK;3. SEAM, University of Messina, Messina, Italy |
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| Abstract: | An adversarial game is used to model a firm's intrinsic and exerted influence over a regulator. Data from the World Business Environment Survey provide strong evidence in support of model hypotheses across a wide range of government agents, countries, and regulatory areas. Of particular relevance to public debate, the theory and econometric analysis show that large firms are more likely to be influential and to benefit from subsidies and low tax constraints. However, large firms are also likely to face greater regulatory constraint from environmental and safety rules. |
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