Inventing or Spying? Implications for Growth |
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Authors: | Guido Cozzi |
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Institution: | (1) Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica,Universitá di Roma ``La Sapienza,', Cornell University, via del Castro Laurenziano9, 00161 Roma, Italy |
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Abstract: | An engineer graduates if shederives the obvious implications of her instructor's hints. Butthe patent system rewards only the first to present nonobviousadvancements—ideas similarly skilled engineers are notexpected to invent. If a fraction of the newly invented hintsspill over before the technological advances they entail arecompleted and granted legal protection, the R&D workerswill find it convenient to spend some time searching for eachother's hints instead of creating their own. A simple modificationof the basic Schumpeterian model shows that the larger the skilledpopulation, the larger the relative incentive to spy. |
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Keywords: | industrial espionage human capital Schumpeterian model patent law |
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