Corruption and privatization: Evidence from a natural experiment in China |
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Authors: | Ling Zhu Dongmin Kong |
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Institution: | Department of Finance, School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China |
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Abstract: | This paper investigates how government corruption shapes state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) privatization. To establish causality, we exploit a natural experiment (i.e., the investigations of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) to document that SOEs significantly deepen privatization after the crackdown on corruption. Further evidence demonstrates two plausible mechanisms driving our findings. Specifically, anti-corruption campaign: 1) accelerates privatization process by curbing the underpricing transfers to state entities and encouraging the normal transfers to private entities or individuals; and 2) by reducing managers' incentives to maintain the dominance of state ownership for expropriation through the discretion of perk consumption. Moreover, our findings are particularly pronounced for SOEs located in areas with high levels of social trust, government intervention, and less information asymmetry. |
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Keywords: | anti-corruption campaign China natural experiment privatization SOEs |
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