环境税制下政府与企业环境治理协同行为演化博弈及仿真研究

构建了政府与企业在环境治理中的博弈模型，采用拟生灭过程演化博弈分析了不同的环境税水平下主体博弈的演化均衡状态以及实现协同治理的环境税制条件，并分析了环境治理博弈突变率和主体学习能力对主体博弈演化均衡状态稳定性的影响。结果表明：在环境治理主体博弈的演化过程中，环境税率对政府和企业协同治理的实现存在门槛效应，并且在不同的政府监管力度差异和企业治理力度差异条件下，环境税的门槛效应存在差异性；环境治理主体的学习能力降低和治理系统突变率提高都会显著降低主体间的协同治理状态的稳定性。最后为促进我国政府与企业环境协同治理提出相应的对策建议。

The Research on Quasi-Birth-Death Evolutionary Game of Synergy Behavior between Government and Enterprise Under Environmental Tax Condition

The game payoff matrix between government and enterprise is constructed, applying Quasi-Birth-Death Evolutionary Game Model to analyze the evolutionary equilibrium under different environmental tax level and the tax condition to achieve the synergy governance, and also analyzing the effect of system mutation rate and subject learning ability on the evolutionary equilibrium.The results show that there exist threshold effect of environmental tax on the synergy governance between government and enterprise in the evolutionary process of environment governance.And under different condition of the gap of strength of government supervision and the gap of strength of enterprise governance, the threshold effects of environmental tax are heterogeneous. Then the enhancement of system mutation rate and decrease of subject learning ability can weaken the stability of synergy equilibrium. At last, the policy suggestions to promote the synergy governance between government and enterprise are provided.