Walrasian analysis via two-player games |
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| Authors: | Carlos Hervés-Beloso Emma Moreno-García |
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| Affiliation: | 1. RGEA, Facultad de Económicas, Universidad de Vigo, Spain;2. Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, Spain;1. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche and CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II, Italy;2. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università di Napoli Federico II, Italy;3. Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, USA;1. Universidade Nova de Lisboa, FCT, Portugal;2. CMA, Portugal;3. Universidad de Salamanca, Spain;4. Vanderbilt University, United States;1. Department of Economics, Rice University, Houston, TX 77251, USA;2. Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USA;1. University of Southern California, 941 Bloom Walk, Los Angeles, CA 90089, United States;2. IBM Almaden Research Center, 650 Harry Rd, San Jose, CA, United States |
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| Abstract: | We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each player represents a different role of the society, formed by all the individuals in the economy. Player 1 selects feasible allocations trying to make Pareto improvements. Player 2 chooses an alternative from the wider range of allocations that are feasible in the sense of Aubin. The set of Nash equilibria of our game is non-empty and our main result provides a characterization of Walrasian equilibria allocations as strong Nash equilibria of the associated society game. |
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