企业寻租的福利效应分析

近20年来，腐败对经济发展的影响得到了国内外越来越多学者的关注。通过构建两地区中两企业和两政府的博弈模型，分析官员自由裁量权和企业寻租行为对经济福利的影响。在将标准均衡结果与寻租均衡结果进行比较后，得到如下结论：首先，寻租降低了经济整体绩效，导致企业总产量降低；第二，发生寻租的地区出口严重下降，甚至导致本地企业为躲避官员掠夺而到其他地区生产并将产品返销本地；第三，寻租有可能因为降低总产量而使市场价格提高进而提升企业绩效，但寻租地区企业绩效的提高幅度较小。研究结论进一步深化了现有文献对腐败与经济发展关系的研究，并对中国制度化反腐机制建设提供理论支持

Analysis of Effects of Rent-seeking on the Welfare

In the past twenty years,more and more economists pay attention to the corruption.This paper builds a two-region,two-firm and two-government game model to analyze the officials discretion and corporate rent-seeking impact on economic welfare.By the comparison between standard equilibrium results and rent-seeking equilibrium results,the following conclusions are drawn:first,rent-seeking reduces the economy as a whole performance,which reduces enterprise production;second,rent-seeking exports serious decline,and even leads to plunder,which driles the local enterprises to other areas for production to avoid officials;third,rent-seeking may reduce production,increase market price and improve enterprise performance,but the business performance in the rent-seeking areas improve less.This paper deepens the existing literature on the research of the relationship between corruption and economic development,and may provide theory support for corruption governance mechanism construction in China.