Bargaining through Approval |
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| Institution: | 1. CNRS-University of Cergy-Pontoise (THEMA, UMR 8184), France;2. CNRS-Paris School of Economics (PjSE, UMR 8545), France;1. Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1, CES, 106 boulevard de l’Hopital, 75013, Paris, France;2. University of La Rochelle (MIA), Avenue Michel Crepeau, 47042, La Rochelle, France;3. University of Leiden, P.O. Box 9512, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands;1. Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica, University of Cagliari, Italy;2. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali, University of Cagliari, viale S. Ignazio 17, 09123 Cagliari, Italy;1. Dorodnicyn Computing Centre of FRC “Computer Science and Control” of Russian Academy of Sciences, Vavilov st., 40,, Moscow, 119333, Russian Federation;2. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, 2nd Education Building, Faculty CMC, GSP-1, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation;1. Departamento de Análisis Económico and ERI-CES, University of Valencia, Facultad de Economía, Campus dels Tarongers, 46022 Valencia, Spain;2. D. Mètodes Quantitatius i Teoria Econòmica and Instituto Desarrollo Social y Paz (IUDESP), Universitat d’Alacant, Spain |
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| Abstract: | The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game. |
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| Keywords: | Two-agents Approval Voting Efficiency Partial honesty |
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