Determinacy of equilibrium in outcome game forms |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Statistics, Forecasting, Mathematics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania;2. Department of Economics, University Carlos III of Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903-Getafe (Madrid), Spain;3. Department of Business and Economics and COHERE, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark;1. Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA;2. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA;3. College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Koç University, Sarıyer, Istanbul, 34450, Turkey;1. Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, 30 Avenue de l’Observatoire, 25009 Besançon, France;2. Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, France |
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| Abstract: | We show the generic finiteness of the number of probability distributions on outcomes induced by Nash equilibria for two-person game forms such that either (i) one of the players has no more than two strategies or (ii) both of the players have three strategies, and (iii) for outcome game forms with three players, each with at most two strategies. Finally, we exhibit an example of a game form with three outcomes and three players for which the Nash equilibria of the associated game induce a continuum of payoffs for an open non-empty set of utility profiles. |
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| Keywords: | Outcome game form Completely mixed Nash equilibrium Generic finiteness |
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