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Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
Affiliation:1. Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel;2. Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain;3. Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Israel;1. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain;2. Erasmus University Rotterdam & Tinbergen Institute, Netherlands;1. School of International Business Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China;2. Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, USA;3. School of Economics, Zhejiang University, China;1. Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, China;2. School of Public Finance and Taxation, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China;3. Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Germany;1. Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Schönberggasse 1, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland;2. Department of Economics, University of Macau, Macao SAR, China
Abstract:We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.
Keywords:Equilibrium existence  Incomplete information  Tullock contests
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