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Cournot tatonnement and potentials |
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| Institution: | 1. Hitotsubashi University, Japan;2. Yokohama National University, Japan;1. School of Business Information, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, 1900 Wenxiang Road, Songjiang district, Shanghai, 201620, China;2. School of Finance, Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce, 2800 Wenxiang Road, Songjiang district, Shanghai, 201620, China |
| Abstract: | We study what topological assumptions should be added to the acyclicity of individual best response improvements in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium in a strategic game, as well as the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in the limit of a best response improvement path. |
| Keywords: | Cournot tatonnement Cournot potential Game with structured utilities Aggregative game |
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