Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements? |
| |
Institution: | 1. Department of Economics and Management, Université de Cergy-Pontoise & THEMA, Cergy-Pontoise, 95011, France;2. Department of Economics, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 30602, USA;1. Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica, University of Cagliari, Italy;2. Dipartimento di Economia, University of Cagliari, Italy |
| |
Abstract: | This paper uses a continuous-time war of attrition model to investigate how learning about private payoffs affects delays in reaching agreement. At each point in time, players may receive a private Poisson signal that completely reveals the concession payoff to be high (good-news learning) or low (bad-news learning). In the good-news model, the expected delay is always non-monotonic in the learning rate: an increase in the learning rate prolongs delay in agreement if the learning rate is sufficiently low. In the bad-news model, numerical examples suggest learning prolongs delay as well. |
| |
Keywords: | Learning War of attrition Delay Incomplete information |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|