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On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist

Institution:	1. Universita’ degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l’Economia e l’Impresa, Via delle Pandette 9, I-50127 Firenze, Italy;2. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Spain;3. Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI, GREMAQ), France;4. Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea;1. Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA;2. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235, USA;3. College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Koç University, Sar?yer, Istanbul, 34450, Turkey;1. Department of Statistics, Forecasting, Mathematics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Babe?-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania;2. Department of Economics, University Carlos III of Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903-Getafe (Madrid), Spain;3. Department of Business and Economics and COHERE, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark

Abstract:	This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if the virtual valuation for each object is non-negative for all possible types, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle. Under an additional regularity condition, pure bundling is the optimal sale mechanism among all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms.

Keywords:	Monopoly pricing Price discrimination Multi-dimensional mechanism design Pure bundling
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