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Correlated equilibria in homogeneous good Bertrand competition
Institution:1. Waseda University, Japan;2. Hokuriku University, Japan
Abstract:We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogeneous goods and identical marginal costs. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called “Bertrand paradox” as well as its most general formulation to date. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players in the following way: The market price cannot be higher than the second lowest marginal cost in any correlated equilibrium.
Keywords:Bertrand paradox  Correlated equilibrium  Price competition
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