On the screening power of incentive schemes |
| |
Authors: | Fredrik Andersson |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Lund University, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden |
| |
Abstract: | We demonstrate the screening power of incentive schemes. The model is a synthesis of a signaling model and the principal-agent problem. A non-cooperative stage where the agent may send a signal precedes a contractual stage where the agent serves a principal under an incentive scheme. After establishing the existence of a revealing equilibrium in an environment with long-lived principals and overlapping contracts, the paper discusses the implications for efficiency of the distribution of surplus. Finally, it is shown that under commitment the agency relationship may serve self-selection purposes and hence reduce the need of costly signaling. |
| |
Keywords: | D82 |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|