基于产权分离的生态产权制度优化研究

文章在梳理产权与生态产权的主要文献以及分析归纳中国生态产权制度运行低效的深层次原因的基础上，提出以“非开发性所有权”为核心概念的生态产权制度优化的理论依据和可能的实践路径，并基于博弈理论采用嵌入激励机制的多阶段双边拍卖模型论证了“非开发性所有权”贝叶斯均衡价格的存在性。研究表明：(1)生态领域的根本利益冲突，既是生态产品极强的正外部性且无法内部化或市场化所引致的，也是产权制度失效的根本成因；(2)基于产权的可分离性原理，可以构建涵盖“非开发性所有权”和“开发性所有权”等权利相兼容的生态产权制度；(3)建立以“非开发性所有权”为交易品的市场，可以作为生态产权制度的优化路径，同时也是生态产品正外部性得以内部化的有效路径；(4)政府生态购买，是生态产权制度优化路径的有效实现形式。当引入激励机制时，基于不完全信息的多阶段双边拍卖机制能够实现贝叶斯均衡的理论购买价格。上述分析内容可以作为生态产权制度改革的政策工具。

A Study on the Optimal Institutional Arrangement of Ecological Property Rights Based on Separation of Property Rights

Based on a literature review of property rights and ecological property rights and the analysis of deep reasons for low efficiency of the operation of ecological property rights system in China,it proposes theoretical basis of optimal institutional arrangement of ecological property rights taking non-development ownership as the core concept and possi-ble practice routes,and employs multi-stage bilateral auction model with embedded incen-tive mechanisms based on game theory to confirm the existence of Bayesian equilibrium price of non-development ownership.It arrives at the following conclusions:firstly,the conflicts of basic interests in ecological field result from extremely strong positive external-ities,and non-internalization or non-marketization of ecological products,and are the root causes of the failure of property rights system;secondly,according to the separability of property rights,the property rights system covering non-exploitable ownership and ex-ploitable ownership can be constructed;thirdly,the construction of market taking non-de-velopment ownership as trading products can be regarded as the optimal route of the prop-erty rights system and simultaneously is the effective route of the internalization of positive externalities of ecological products;fourthly,government ecological purchase is the effec-tive realization form of the optimal route of the property rights system.When introducing incentive mechanisms,multi-stage bilateral auction model based on incomplete information can achieve theoretical purchase price of Bayesian equilibrium.The above conclusions can be taken as policy instruments of the reform of the property rights system.