| 大型游乐设施安装监理与业主关系模型的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 姜梦,等.大型游乐设施安装监理与业主关系模型的研究[J].价值工程,2014(19):40-42. |
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| 作者姓名： | 姜梦 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南交通大学机械工程研究所,成都610031 |
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| 摘 要： | 大型游乐设施安装监理与业主之间存在非对称信息,由此会引发"逆向选择"和"道德风险"。根据分布函数的参数化方法,建立业主与安装监理的委托代理模型,分析得出业主在信息不对称情况下需要额外支付监理单位剩余索取权。运用迭代方法解决委托代理模型中信息不对称的问题,并以某游乐园二期设备安装项目为例,通过对比不同监理形式的收益情况,验证了迭代方法可有效降低信息不对称的程度,以利于获取最大净收益。
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| 关 键 词： | 大型游乐设施 委托代理模型 安装监理 迭代方法 |
Research of Relationship Model between Owners and Installation Supervisions of Large-scale Recreation Facilities |
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| JIANG Meng,XU Zhi-pei,CAO Huan-huan.Research of Relationship Model between Owners and Installation Supervisions of Large-scale Recreation Facilities[J].Value Engineering,2014(19):40-42. |
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| Authors: | JIANG Meng XU Zhi-pei CAO Huan-huan |
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| Institution: | ( Institute of Mechanical Engineering ,Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China ) |
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| Abstract: | Asymmetric information problem exists between project owners and installation supervisions of large-scale recreation facilities which leads to ＆quot;Adverse Selection＆quot; and ＆quot;Moral Hazard＆quot;. This paper establishes the Principal-agent model for the relationship between the owners and the installation supervisions based on Parameterized Distribution Formulation. Analysis on the model indicates that the owners have to pay the Residual Claim to the supervisions due to the Asymmetric information which encourages the supervisions to undertake higher cost of risk. Iterative method is used to solve the Asymmetric information problem and its validity is been verified by analyzing the equipment installation project of the second phase of an amusement park case. |
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| Keywords: | large-scale recreation facilities principal-agent model installation supervision iterative method |
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