| Does a deviation between the rights and obligations of the board and controlling shareholders affect firm value？ |
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| 摘 要： | This study examines the association between firm value and ownership structure, when board and controlling stockholders＇ voting rights deviate from obligations. The measurement of the corporate governance variables is different from prior research. The author further investigates whether monitoring mechanisms can alleviate the agency problem due to percentage of outside directors. The empirical results show that the higher board voting rights-obligations is deviated, which means the weaker relation with the firm value. The author also finds the monitoring from outside directors can reduce the agency problems from board＇s deviation and thus can improve firm value. But the results of the controlling stockholders＇ deviation are mixed or insignificant. This research has implications for Taiwan＇s regulators who are striving to improve the information, transparency, and corporate governance of board and controlling shareholders＇ voting rights-obligations deviation.
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| 关 键 词： | 会计 报表 帐簿 职责 |
Does a deviation between the rights and obligations of the board and controlling shareholders affect firm value？ |
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| Authors: | HUANG Chuan-chuan |
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| Institution: | Department of Accounting, Feng Chia University, Taichung 40724, Taiwan |
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| Abstract: | corporate governance share collateralization voting rights-obligations deviation director＇s monitoring mechanisms firm value |
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| Keywords: | corporate governance share collateralization voting rights-obligations deviation director＇s monitoring mechanisms firm value |
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