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Information acquisition and institutions: An organizational perspective
Authors:Travis Ng
Institution:1. Chaoyang University of Technology, 168, Jifeng E. Rd., Wufeng District, Taichung, Taiwan;2. National Central University, 300, Jhongda Road, Jhongli City, Taoyuan, Taiwan;3. Vanderbilt University, 2301 Vanderbilt Place, Nashville, TN, United States;1. Delft University of Technology, PO Box 5, 2600 AA Delft, The Netherlands;2. TNO, PO Box 5050, 2600 GB Delft, The Netherlands;3. A?bo Akademi University, Tuomiokirkontori 3, FI-20500 Turku, Finland;4. Royal KPN, PO Box 30000, 2500 GA The Hague, The Netherlands;1. WU, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Research Institute for Regulatory Economics, Heiligenstädter Straße 46-48, A-1190 Vienna, Austria;2. WU, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institute for Quantitative Economics, Research Institute for Regulatory Economics, Augasse 2-6, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Abstract:Using a World Bank survey of Chinese firms, I construct a set of measures to capture the extent to which a firm involves outsiders in information acquisition. I find that firms that outsource more are not more likely to involve outsiders in acquiring information. Weakening contracting institutions raises the difficulty of safeguarding information leakage, more so when a firm involves outsiders in information acquisition than when no outsiders are involved. I test this prediction and find that firms under weaker contracting institutions are significantly less likely to involve outsiders in information acquisition.
Keywords:Information acquisition  Contracting institutions  Information leakage  Trade secrets  Theory of the firm
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