首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Boardroom centrality and firm performance
Authors:David F. Larcker  Eric C. So  Charles C.Y. Wang
Affiliation:1. Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Stanford, CA 94305, United States;2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, United States;3. Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, United States
Abstract:Firms with central boards of directors earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns. A long (short) position in the most (least) central firms earns average annual returns of 4.68%. Firms with central boards also experience higher future return-on-assets growth and more positive analyst forecast errors. Return prediction, return-on-assets growth, and analyst errors are concentrated among high growth opportunity firms or firms confronting adverse circumstances, consistent with boardroom connections mattering most for firms standing to benefit most from information and resources exchanged through boardroom networks. Overall, our results suggest that director networks provide economic benefits that are not immediately reflected in stock prices.
Keywords:
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号