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Measuring Motivations for the Reciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game
Authors:Gary E Bolton  Jordi Brandts  Axel Ockenfels
Institution:(1) Department of Management Science and Information Systems, Penn State University, 310 Beam, 16802 University Park, PA, USA;(2) Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain;(3) Axel Ockenfels, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Magdeburg, Postfach 4120, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany
Abstract:A reciprocal action is an action meant to have a similar influence on another's payoff as another's action has on one's own. One hypothesis asserts that reciprocal action is triggered by the reciprocator's belief that another's action was good or ill intended. The other hypothesis says that the reciprocator is simply acting to implement fixed preferences over payoff allocations. We report on an experiment that allows us to study both positive (reward) and negative (punishment) reciprocal action in a single framework. Knowing the preferences for payoff allocations is sufficient to account for nearly all the reciprocal action we observe in our experiment.
Keywords:experimental economics  reciprocity  motivations  dilemma game
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