管理报酬机制的构建

两权分离制度形成了企业所有者和经营者的委托代理关系,由于双方利益的冲突,委托人必然采取措施促使两者利益的趋同,报酬机制就是其中的一种有效的激励措施。本文以S=S0 aS1 bS2 E作为报酬方案的简化模型,具体分析了模型相关的构成因素,并以美国大企业管理人员报酬构成为例加以说明。

Establishment of Managerial Compensation Plans

Agency problems between firm owners and managers occur because of the separation of ownership and control. For the conflict of the two parts above the principals always take some measures to prevent the agent from acting in a manner that is against the principals' interests. As a result, an executive compensation plan is an effective one of incentive measures. In this article we establish a simple pattern, which is S=S0 aS1 bS2 E. The pattern detailedly analyzes the interrelated elements which are illustrated by the managerial compensation plans of firms in the United State.