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A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising
Authors:Roger D. Blair  David L. Kaserman
Affiliation:1. University of Florida, 32611-2017, Gainesville, FL, USA
2. Auburn University, 36830, Auburn, AL, USA
Abstract:
This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.
Keywords:Franchising  incentive incompatibility  vertical control
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