不同质量能力企业的质量信号选择偏好分析

质量能力提升与质量信号传递是新常态下制造业企业提高产品质量，实现市场需求的重要途径。基于2015年中国企业-员工匹配调查数据，运用Oprobit模型对不同质量能力企业的产品质量信号选择偏好进行研究。结果表明，质量战略能力强的企业更倾向于选择强制性标准或市场性价格作为质量信号传递的载体，质量运营能力强的企业更倾向于选择自愿性商标或强制性标准作为质量信号传递的载体，而质量管控能力对质量信号选择倾向的作用不显著，质量竞争能力强的企业并不认可除品牌外的质量信号作为产品质量能力的效用。基于此，建议加大对标准信息缺失或造假的监管力度，鼓励企业进行第三方认证，降低第三方认证成本，同时鼓励企业进行质量战略能力及品牌能力的建设与提升。

Analysis of Quality Signal Preference of Enterprises with Different Quality Capabilities

Improving quality ability and transferring quality signal is important to improve product quality and obtain competitive advantages in the new normal.Based on the cross section data from China Employer Employee Survey (CEES),we made an oprobit model to study the relationship between the quality capability and their acceptance of product quality signals of manufacturing enterprises.The results show that enterprises with high quality strategy tend to choose mandatory standard or market price as the carrier of quality signal transmission.Enterprises with high quality operation ability are more likely to choose voluntary trademark or mandatory standard as the carrier of quality signal transmission.Quality control ability is not significant to enterprises' signal selection tendency.Enterprises with high quality competitive ability do not recognize the effectiveness of any other quality signal except brand.Based on these findings,we propose to increase supervision on the missing or counterfeit of standard information,and to encourage enterprises to carry out third-party certification,and to promote their quality strategic capacity.In the meanwhile,the government should reduce the cost of third-party certification.