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民营银行"所有制歧视"的低效分析
引用本文:郑文博. 民营银行"所有制歧视"的低效分析[J]. 山西财经大学学报, 2004, 0(1): 105-108
作者姓名:郑文博
作者单位:中央党校经济学教研部 北京100091
摘    要:由于民营银行所有制歧视存在,使得我国的金融体系不健全。民营银行的缺位,国有银行占据垄断地位及国有银行贷款对象有所有制偏好,非公有制经济尤其是中小企业难以从国有银行取得发展所需的贷款,导致金融资源配置低效,对国民经济造成损失。解决民营银行所有制歧视给国民经济所带来的低效,发展民营银行是必然选择。发展民营银行最大的问题就是其风险问题,为此,要建立起有效的风险防范机制,尤其是加强监管,规范其发展。

关 键 词:所有制歧视  民营银行  金融风险  银行监管
文章编号:1007-9556(2004)01-0105-04
修稿时间:2003-11-08

An Analysis of Low Efficiency of Ownership Discrimination at Privately - Run Banks
ZHENG Wen-bo. An Analysis of Low Efficiency of Ownership Discrimination at Privately - Run Banks[J]. Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University, 2004, 0(1): 105-108
Authors:ZHENG Wen-bo
Abstract:The financial system is distempered because of ownership discrimination at the privately-run banks. The privately-run banks combined with monopoly of state-owned banks make it difficult for the non-publicly owned businesses to obtained loans needed. Inefficiency in the allocation of financial resources thus results, which stands a loss to the national economy as a whole. In order to overcome this defect, privately-run banking must be developed, and at the same time, effective risk aversion mechanism and supervision system must be given due importance.
Keywords:ownership discrimination  privately-run banking  risk  supervision
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