Central versus local education finance: a political economy approach |
| |
Authors: | Rainald Borck |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany |
| |
Abstract: | This paper models voters’ preferences over central versus local education policies when there are private alternatives. Education
is financed by income taxes and individuals are mobile between communities. Public education levels are chosen by majority
vote. Contrary to conventional wisdom, centralisation may benefit the rich and poor, while the middle class prefer decentralised
education. The model is also extended to include peer effects. Peer effects increase the support for central school finance,
even in the community with good public schools.
|
| |
Keywords: | Education Centralisation Private schools Majority voting |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|