基于报酬合约的经理人羊群行为研究

本文在信息不对称和经理人有限理性的背景下,以经理人风险厌恶及报酬与其相对业绩相关性为假设前提,基于经理人安全理性原则,构造了一个二元经理人的羊群行为模型,证明了经理人决策过程的相互影响关系,以及经理人为谋求个人效用的最大化,不得不考虑竞争对手的行为选择;并将模型扩展到n个经理人,进一步发现了经理人羊群行为发生的内在经济逻辑。文章贡献在于用模型化方法证明了经理人经营决策羊群行为的存在性,且羊群行为的显著程度与经理人的报酬结构(收入系数和股权比例等)相关。对上市公司的实证研究也支持这一结论。

A STUDY OF REMUNERATION-BASED MANAGERIAL HERD BEHAVIOR

Based on the assumption that managers hold the principle of safety-first when facing risk,and their remuneration is partly based on relative performance,this paper develops a behavioral model of managerial herd behavior.We first develop a model involving two managers,and then extend it to a model of n managers.Our results capture the predictions of other theories trying to explain the herd behavior.In particular,we find that herd behavior is linked to the manager?s remuneration structure.Our empirical study...