森林碳汇储备中政府监管与林农行为博弈分析

基于碳汇发展过程中政府与林农之间的博弈关系,结合嵌入式社会结构理论、农户经济理论和正式制度与非正式制度理论,构建政府监管和林农行为选择博弈模型,分析双方的博弈收益。结果表明:政府采取监管、加大扶持力度、建立健全碳汇发展体制机制、完善碳汇市场体系等措施,林农会选择执行监管政策;反之,若政府不实施相关政策,加之林农对森林碳汇认识不够,参与森林碳汇储备意愿不强等,林农会选择不执行监管政策。因此,急需建立健全碳汇交易市场体制机制、完善碳汇林补贴政策、加大政策宣传力度、创新政府监管模式,以期有效推动森林碳汇储备,从而加快森林碳汇项目发展。

Game Analysis of Government Supervision and Forest Farmers' Behavior in Forest Carbon Sequestration Reserve

(1)Background——The development of forest carbon sequestration is in line with the general trend of green development and an important means to solve the problem of carbon emission reduction. However,compared with some countries,China's forest carbon sequestration is developing slowly and its development mechanism is not sound. As the main supplier of forest carbon sequestration,forest farmers' decision-making on forest carbon sequestration reserve depends on many factors.(2)Results——Farmers are the suppliers of forest carbon sequestration. The government,as the supplier of forest carbon sequestration reserve policy,is also the supervisor of farmers' behavior. It is assumed that both the government and farmers are limited rational economic persons in the process of forest carbon sequestration reserve. The implementation policy of forest farmers is directly proportional to the cost of government supervision and government subsidy for forest carbon sequestration reserve. On the basis of improving the carbon sequestration market system and expanding the trading channels of carbon sequestration,the government has strengthened its supervision on forest carbon sequestration reserve of forest farmers. Forest farmers have to carry out the policy under this pressure,in order to avoid unnecessary punishment. In addition,the government's subsidy support for forest farmers is also an important factor in encouraging forest farmers to actively implement policy. Therefore,two mandatory institutional measures have prompted forest farmers to choose to participate in forest carbon sequestration reserve. Whether the government chooses to supervise depends on the size of its own benefits; on the other hand,from the perspective of forest farmers,the government's choice of supervisory measures is affected by the behavior of forest farmers and the cost-benefit of forest farmer' participation in forest carbon sequestration reserve. Based on the theory of peasant household economy,forest farmers are limited rational economic men who pursue profit maximization,labor avoidance and risk avoidance. The probability of government supervision is inversely proportional to the cost of forest farmers choosing to participate in carbon sequestration reserve.The less the forest farmers pay,the less the forest farmers are willing to invest too much cost to the supervision and maintenance of carbon sequestration forests for the purpose of maximizing profits,thus stimulating government departments to strengthen supervision to ensure the effective policy implementation; on the other hand,the probability that the government chooses to supervise is directly proportional to the fine that farmers receive,indicating that the more government fine imposes on forest farmers,the greater the government's supervision.(3) Conclusions and Discussions——In the reserve of forest carbon sequestration,forest farmers as the main body of carbon sequestration supply,and the government as the supervisor,have certain contradictions in their behavioral choices in the process of promoting the development of forest carbon sequestration project for their own interests,and thus become the key players in the game. While global warming is becoming more and more prominent,the international and domestic carbon emission reduction task remains arduous. Forest carbon sequestration is an important means of carbon emission reduction. Whether carbon sequestration reserve can work smoothly depends on the effect of government policy implementation and the choice of forest farmers' behavior. In view of the game analysis of forest farmers and the government,the following suggestions are put forward: first,we should establish and improve the system and mechanism of carbon sequestration trading market,perfect the subsidy policy of carbon sequestration forests,and improve the participation enthusiasm of forest farmers; second,we should intensify the promotion of forest carbon sequestration and change the traditional concepts of forest farmers; third,we should innovate the mode of government supervision and play to the full advantages of the forestry cooperation organization.