Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution |
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引用本文: | Yang Zhang. Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution[J]. 中国经济评论(英文版), 2006, 5(4): 20-25 |
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作者姓名: | Yang Zhang |
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摘 要: |
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关 键 词: | 信息披露制度 内部审计 会计监督 企业财务 |
Game for Information Disclosure and the Auditing Institution |
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Abstract: | This paper takes Principal-agent Theory as the basic analysis flame to analyze the modern corporate principal and agent in a state of the two sides in asymmetric information on the basis of self-interest maximization, and the game strategy which revolves the information disclosure and hideaway to launch, and therefore can get the game way which causes the auditing institution. The equilibrium in game of the information disclosure causes the auditing institution, the expense and cost which the audit profession consumes is the company governs reduces the information not asymmetrical diligently center essential agency costs. |
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Keywords: | principal and agent disclosure of information game strategy auditing institution |
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