公司风险视角下上市国企管理层股权激励研究

在允许国有控股上市公司实施股权激励的背景下，考察了其不同种类风险与经营者股权激励强度的关系。先界定了风险的类型，再通过构建基于风险的两种股权激励模型，并进一步推导得出：若国有上市企业的管理层不能（可以）买卖公司以外的市场证券组合时，其最优股权激励强度与公司特别性风险成反向变化关系，而与公司整体性风险的相关关系不确定（无关），这为正在实践中摸索的国有上市企业管理层股权激励合同的设计提供了进一步的理论建议。

Research on stock option based incentives of the listed SOEs from the risk perspective

Under the background that the state-controlled companies are permitted to carry out incentive stock option, relation between managers＂ stock option incentive intensity and their firms＂ risk characteristic in state-controlled companies Listed is explored. The whole risk of state-controlled companies listed is divided into two parts which are integral risk and special risk. And then two types of stock option incentive models are structured. The paper results from model and draws the conclusion that managers can not trade the market portfolio, optimal stock option incentive intensity decreases with increasing of firms＂ nonsystematic risk but is ambiguously affected by firms＂ systematic risk;when managers can trade the market portfolio, the optimal stock option incentive intensity decreases with firms＂ nonsystematic risk but is not affected by systematic risk. The result provides managers with a theoretical direction of design of payment contract in practice.