| 我国劳动力市场买方垄断条件下最低工资就业效应分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 罗小兰. 我国劳动力市场买方垄断条件下最低工资就业效应分析[J]. 财贸研究, 2007, 18(4): 1-5 |
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| 作者姓名： | 罗小兰 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海财经大学,公共经济与管理学院,上海,200433 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海财经大学研究生创新基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章探讨了劳动力市场买方垄断条件下最低工资对就业的影响。研究表明:无歧视买方垄断下,实行最低工资能促进就业;完全歧视买方垄断下,实行最低工资对就业没有影响。此外,关于上海市最低工资与农民工就业的实证分析结果表明,提高最低工资对农民工就业有正作用。由此导出了一个重要的政策含义,即提高最低工资标准,促进农民工就业。
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| 关 键 词： | 劳动力市场 买方垄断 最低工资 就业效应 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-05-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-05-06 |
Analysis of the Employment Effect of Minimum Wages in China's Monopsony Labor Market |
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| LUO Xiao-lan. Analysis of the Employment Effect of Minimum Wages in China's Monopsony Labor Market[J]. Finance and Trade Research, 2007, 18(4): 1-5 |
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| Authors: | LUO Xiao-lan |
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| Affiliation: | School of Public Finance and Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 203433 |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the employment effect of minimum wages in the monopsony labor market. The result shows that in the non-discriminative monopsony labor market the minimum wage rule has a positive effect, while in the perfectly discriminative monopsony labor market the minimum wage has no influence. A case study also shows that the minimum wage can promote the rural-workers’ employment in Shanghai. Finally the article deduces an important policy of increasing the minimum wage standard. |
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| Keywords: | labor market monopsony minimum wage employment effect |
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