Who Receives Farm Government Payments?

If we do not systematically attempt to collect data and assess distributional impacts, we shall always be surprised by the many unintended consequences of our public decisions. (Bonnen 1969, p. 447) Direct government payments to farmers have tripled in the last half of the 1980s. Market price support programs (for example, the Western Grain Transportation Act, among others) and supply management regulation continue to be topics of debate among policy analysts. Certainly the debate has become intensified by the discussions surrounding the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round of talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. When all census farms are distributed across gross sales classes, the “selected” programs included in this study tend to be more concentrated among the mid-sized farms than are aggregate gross sales. However, if one considers Prairie grain farms distributed across farm size classes measured in terms of grain acres, gross sales, net farm income (specifically, NCFIWF) and the net “benefits” of “selected” government programs are similarly concentrated. For example, Prairie farms with 320 to 599 acres of grain report 24% to 26% of each of these four items.²⁶ The “selected” programs included in this study tend to pay about the same size of payout per farm household, regardless of the size of household income. We obtain this result because farm size in terms of gross farm sales tends to be the same, regardless of the size of household total net income. Across the spectrum of farm financial stability classes, the net “benefit” of the “selected” programs in this study tend to be distributed similarly to gross farm sales. The results depend on exactly how one implements the classification but more than two thirds of gross sales and more than two thirds of net “benefits” of “selected” programs accrue to farms with a higher level of financial stability. Across the spectrum of rates of return on equity as an indicator of farm efficiency, about one third of gross sales and one third of net “benefits” of “ selected” programs accrue to farms with a rate of return on equity of 10% or more. The potential impact of deregulation of supply management depends on one‘ s assumption. Three scenarios are presented here and, in each case, both “winners” and “losers” are identified. Between 4% and 37% of households on farms with quota would move from above to below the Statistics Canada low-income cutoff (LICO), depending on the scenario under consideration. However, in each seen-ario, there are cases of households moving from below to above LICO as a result of our calculated impact of deregulating supply management. This paper takes its lead from Bonnen's observation about “unintended consequences.” We do not offer an “evaluation” of any government program. Our sole objective is to illustrate “distributional impacts” so that all individuals in the policy debate may speak from an informed perspective. This paper represents an initial step in developing an “informed perspective.” As the first note to this paper indicates, an important ancillary objective is to illustrate the potential of Statistics Canada databases to provide tabulations to answer specific Questions posed by researchers and policy analysts.