Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: The unassigned-offeror problem |
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| Authors: | Claudia M Landeo Kathryn E Spier |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Alberta, Economics Department, Henry Marshall Tory Building 7-25, Edmonton, AB T6G 2H4, Canada;2. Harvard Law School and NBER, 1575 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138, United States |
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| Abstract: | Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory. |
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| Keywords: | K40 C72 C90 D82 |
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