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Task assignment under agent loss aversion |
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| Authors: | Kohei Daido Kimiyuki Morita Takeshi Murooka Hiromasa Ogawa |
| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, 1-155 Ichiban-cho Uegahara Nishinomiya, Hyogo, 662-8501, Japan;2. Graduate School of Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8601, Japan;3. Department of Economics, University of California-Berkeley, 530 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA;4. Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan |
| Abstract: | We analyze a task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on future states. If the agents have concave utility, the principal assigns the task to them contingent on the state. We show that if the agents are loss averse, a state-independent assignment–assigning the task to a single agent in all states–can be optimal even when the principal can write a contingent contract at no cost. |
| Keywords: | D03 D86 M12 M52 |
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