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Quality cut-offs in procurement auctions
Authors:Mridu Prabal Goswami
Institution:Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel
Abstract:Recently the Government of India used procurement auction mechanisms with endogenously determined minimum quality. We find these auctions have no equilibrium in continuous symmetric monotonic pure strategies. This may substantiate the use of auction mechanisms with exogenously determined minimum quality.
Keywords:C7  D44
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